Emotional Intelligence and Self-Efficacy in Military Leaders

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Emotional Intelligence and Self-Efficacy in Military Leaders

A Dissertation by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Education in Organizational Leadership

March 2016

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ABSTRACT

Emotional Intelligence and Self-Efficacy in Military Leaders

by Kelly A. Hudson

Purpose: This quantitative study was conducted for the purpose of determining the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in military leaders.

Methodology: This quantitative, correlational study measured emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in military leaders to determine the relationship between them. The study involved differentiating between non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers in order to determine if a difference exists between the types of leaders in the military.

Findings: The findings from this research illustrate that there is a relationship between the leaders’ emotional intelligence and self-efficacy.

Conclusions: The study supported the hypothesis that the higher a leader’s emotional intelligence, the higher the leader’s self-efficacy.

Recommendations: Further research is recommended to increase generalizability to the entire U.S. Armed Forces.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

For decades people have searched for good leaders to keep them safe, to provide them with sustenance, and to guide them on the right path. In the book *Leading So People Will Follow*, Andersen (2012) explained how her research into folktales around the world uncovered the same core attributes of leaders. All of the folktales portrayed leaders as heroes who were farsighted, passionate, courageous, wise, generous, and trustworthy (Anderson, 2012). Anderson made the point that humans are “hardwired” to expect our leaders to demonstrate these traits. Many authors have listed personality traits and attributes of good leaders, some even stating the characteristics needed will change depending on the circumstances, and the best traits to watch for and nurture are the intangible ones (Davis, 2010). In addition, many sources of information have suggested how organizations can develop their leaders. Leader development has become increasingly desired because in business it is believed that “great leaders deliver great results” (Fulmer & Bleak, 2008, p. 3). These sources agree that good leadership is the key to motivating employees, fostering creativity, and raising profits.

Military leadership and civilian leadership share many attributes, but the content of the training for each can be quite different, by necessity. The threats military members face are physical, while the main threats corporations typically face are economic. The military as an organization operates in a variety of settings, including war zones, and this generates an entire set of desired attributes that civilian corporations do not always address. For instance, the U.S. Army (1999) field manual on leadership, FM 22-100, discusses the concept of “will” as an important mental attribute. “Will is the inner drive that compels soldiers and leaders to keep going when they are exhausted, hungry, afraid,
cold, and wet…Will enables soldiers to press the fight to its conclusion” (United States Army, 1999, pp. 2-11). FM 22-100 lists the Army values to guide leaders, which is shown in the acronym LDRSHIP: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. These values are drilled into all U.S. Army leaders throughout their training.

Military leadership sometimes takes place in an office setting and can require traditional leadership skills, but military leaders must also be prepared to lead in hostile environments. Samuels, Foster, and Lindsay (2010) elaborated, “Effective military personnel must be adept at all aspects of leading, ranging from traditional office environments to austere forward deployed locations” (p. S119). Combat zones leave little room for the softer side of leadership, which might be why the military does not always train leaders to be sensitive to emotions. This can result in a lack of awareness in leaders to their own emotions and to those of their subordinates.

However, notwithstanding military leaders’ lack of emphasis in training regarding sensitivity to emotions, studies have shown that leaders’ emotional intelligence quotient is as important to their success as is their intelligence quotient (Bradberry & Greaves, 2009). Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee (2013) also strongly attested the importance of emotional intelligence. In the book Primal Leadership: Unleashing the Power of Emotional Intelligence, Goleman et al. stated, “Even if they get everything else just right, if leaders fail in this primal task of driving emotions in the right direction, nothing they do will work as well as it could or should” (p. 3).

In addition to emotional intelligence, self-efficacy, the belief in one’s ability, has also been studied and found to be crucial to effective leadership (Bandura, 1997). Davis
(2010) quoted Bandura (1997) extensively in his book *The Intangibles of Leadership*. Davis stated that self-efficacy is one of the most crucial intangible leadership traits and should be developed. According to Bandura, self-efficacy can be developed in four ways: by succeeding in the face of adversity, by watching others succeed through effort, by receiving positive feedback from others, and by our physical and emotional states. Goleman et al. (2013) believed that self-efficacy, or believing that one can accomplish what one sets out to do, can be contagious and can affect the confidence of others, by stating, “We can move mountains, say people in the first group. Nothing we do is going to make a lick of difference, say people in the second. Which type of person are others going to follow?” (p. 171). It would seem then, that people in the first group, self-efficacious people, would be the most effective leaders at inspiring confidence in subordinates.

Yet there is little empirical evidence that military training includes references to emotional intelligence or self-efficacy, two traits that have been proven to be crucial to good leaders. The researcher reviewed over 35 writings on military leadership for this study. Not one mentioned the terms emotional intelligence or self-efficacy, although many discussed aspects of each. It could be reasonably argued that emotional intelligence and self-efficacy are as important to military leaders as they are to traditional leaders for many of the same reasons. Is the military not developing these traits in their leaders? Or are they building the skills without using language related to the terms emotional intelligence and self-efficacy? If the terms were used, understood, and assessed as part of military leaders’ career development, would their importance to leadership and mission accomplishment be better reinforced?
Background

In an article written for *Education* magazine, Ingram and Cangemi (2012) stated, “If leaders cannot develop a genuine desire on the part of others to follow them, team and organization goals will be at risk of failure” (p. 2). Two years prior to Ingram and Cangemi, Awadzi-Calloway (2010) also spotlighted the importance of leadership. In her dissertation, Awadzi-Calloway underscored that for years scholars have studied leadership to discover the attributes and skills of good leaders in the hope of shaping future leaders. Awadzi-Calloway also asserted that militaries have been studying leadership and leadership development long before it became a topic in the corporate sector, stating that unit effectiveness depends on leadership, morale, and cohesion.

Samuels et al. (2010) further differentiated between leadership contexts, drawing a distinction between traditional leadership and the leadership that occurs in dangerous contexts (p. S117). They described dangerous contexts as life-threatening circumstances faced by first responders such as police and firefighters and by members of the armed forces. They asserted that military leadership, or dangerous context leadership, is a situational context that can “change the dynamic between leaders and followers in meaningful ways” (Samuels et al., 2010, p. S118). Additionally, Kolditz (2007) interviewed parachutists, SWAT team chiefs, special operations soldiers, and others. From these interviews, Kolditz identified several attributes critical to dangerous context leaders: (a) they embrace continuous learning because dangerous situations demand it, (b) they share risks with followers, (c) they maintain a common lifestyle with followers and emphasize shared values rather than material possessions, (d) they possess technical
competence, (e) they create feelings of trust among team members, and (f) they exhibit and create loyalty (pp. 160-187).

FM 22-100 describes preferred leadership styles as participating and delegating over directing, and transformational over transactional, with the caveat that the most effective leaders combine techniques to fit the situation (United States Army, 1999). Samuels et al. (2010) highlighted in their article on self-efficacy in dangerous contexts that predicting the exact nature of dangerous situations makes preparation problematic for military leaders. FM 22-100 asserts, however, that a military leader can achieve unit and individual readiness through training, discipline, and preparation. But the leadership field manual does not specifically discuss how to prepare emotionally for danger, other than displaying self-control (United States Army, 1999), without explaining how. The manual does not discuss emotional intelligence in military leaders, although it does tell leaders that they must have the emotional attributes of self-control, balance, and stability, again without explaining how to gain these attributes.

Bradberry and Greaves (2009) stated in their book Emotional Intelligence 2.0 that emotions can inhibit a person’s ability to think rationally. They explained that a person’s primary senses enter the brain near the spinal cord and must travel through the limbic system (the primary source of emotions) before they arrive at the front of the brain (where rational thought occurs). Emotional intelligence requires effective communication between the emotional and rational centers of the brain (Bradberry & Greaves, 2009, p. 7). They stated, “Only 36 percent of the people we tested are able to accurately identify their emotions as they happen” (Bradberry & Greaves, 2009, p. 14), and they also postulated that emotional intelligence, or understanding one’s emotions and
those of others in order to better manage them, is “the strongest driver of leadership and personal excellence” (Bradberry & Greaves, 2009, p. 21).

FM 22-100 does not mention the term emotional intelligence. It addresses desired emotional attributes such as self-control, balance, and stability, with admonitions to remain calm under pressure (United States Army, 1999). However, these emotional attributes are different than military leaders’ ability to understand their own emotions as well as the emotions of others, which is the heart of emotional intelligence. It is ironic that FM 22-100 does not mention the term emotional intelligence for military leaders; hostile environments are emotion amplifiers, resulting in leaders subjugating their emotions in order to drive on with the mission. In a study published in The Leadership Quarterly, authors discovered conflicting findings about the most effective type of leadership in crisis situations (Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio, & Cavaretta, 2009). They concluded that the conflicting data may be a result of studies being conducted under very different extreme conditions. They submitted that a typology is needed as well as further research to identify the best mixture of transactional and transformational leadership in extreme situations. Their study did not address emotional intelligence as a possible factor of leadership.

In his dissertation on emotional intelligence in senior enlisted U.S. Navy leaders, Leigh (2012) pointed out that in addition to the traditional emotional intelligence goals of identifying, understanding, and managing the emotions of self and others, Navy senior enlisted members are also responsible for maintaining a positive emotional command climate. Leigh asserted that without emotional intelligence, these senior enlisted members may be ill-equipped to lead their sailors in a constantly evolving environment.
Mula (2013) agreed with Leigh (2012), stating in his dissertation that retention in an all-volunteer force depends on a positive command climate. Mula’s study focused on U.S. Army National Guard leaders, and the study findings showed a positive correlation between emotional intelligence and transformational leadership. He stated his hope that the findings would guide emotional intelligence training to improve the leadership in the U.S. Army National Guard.

In addition to emotional intelligence, self-efficacy is a critical trait for military leaders. Bandura (1997) pioneered the study of self-efficacy as a critical leadership trait in his book *Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control*. The main discovery of Bandura’s research findings was that people need to believe they can do something in order to be able to do it. Since then, others have confirmed his findings and have explored the importance of self-efficacy. Davis (2010) described self-efficacy as a “crucial, intangible” (p. 170) leadership trait. Davis proceeded to say that leaders’ confidence to accomplish what needs to be accomplished even in the face of obstacles allows good leaders to engage in successful actions: They “want the ball” (p. 172) to run with it as a quarterback does; they inspire others to want the ball as well; they face challenges head-on, and they are not derailed by setbacks.

Samuels et al. (2010), referenced Bandura’s (1997) work on self-efficacy when they made the following summary,

> It seems clear that increases in self-efficacy can lead directly to increases in performance across a variety of domains. In other words, individuals who know that they have the requisite skills for task accomplishment and the ability to apply those skills are more likely to succeed. (p. S121)
Samuels et al. (2010) drew from Bandura’s (1997) studies of transferability to conclude that self-efficacy’s ability to transfer across situations makes it a very useful concept in preparing leaders for danger contexts. For instance, leaders can be put through anxiety-producing scenarios in the safety of a training setting. Their success in the training environment may give them confidence in a danger context, regardless of the exact nature of the situation.

The perceived competence of military leaders can also be an important contributor to soldier self-efficacy in a garrison (established, home military base) training environment (Chen & Bliese, 2002). It is possible, then, that a leader’s successful training and accomplishments in garrison will build the leader and his/her subordinates’ self-efficacy.

**Statement of the Research Problem**

Napoleon Bonaparte was quoted in the U.S. Army Leadership field manual as saying, “A man does not have himself killed for a few halfpence a day or for a petty distinction. You must speak to the soul in order to electrify the man” (United States Army, 1999, pp. 3-16). Leadership is a critical skill in any organization, but the unique mission of the military makes leadership in that field a matter of life and death. Military leaders are responsible for the training, discipline, and morale of their subordinates, the status of which may determine whether or not those subordinates return home safely after a mission.

In spite of the importance of leadership skills in the military, there is a lack of empirical evidence documenting studies of how to cultivate emotional intelligence or self-efficacy in military leaders. Bradberry and Greaves (2009) identified emotional
intelligence as “the single biggest predictor of performance in the workplace and the strongest driver of leadership and personal excellence” (p. 21). FM 22-100 stresses the need for leaders to be mature, controlling their emotions and remaining calm under pressure and “in the face of danger” (United States Army, 1999, pp. 2-18). Without using the term “emotional intelligence,” the manual describes traits of emotional intelligence, stating, “Emotionally balanced leaders display the right emotion for the situation and can also read others’ emotional state” (United States Army, 1999, pp. 2-18). The problem is that the manual does not tell the reader how to accomplish this.

The U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is dedicated to the research of topics and trends that affect the military. The site states:

Leadership and the military are practically inseparable. Military leadership and leadership development are foundational concepts for Army personnel. It permeates military culture beginning with every recruit learning the leadership-oriented Warrior Ethos to the leadership development offered to the Army’s general officers. (Strategic Studies Institute, n.d., Main section, para. 1)

Although they are dedicated to the strategic research needed to support the U.S. Army war college curricula and to providing analysis for Army and Department of Defense leadership, the SSI does not have a single article on their site that addresses emotional intelligence or self-efficacy. This pervasive lack of information about two important leadership traits could put military members at risk by contributing to a knowledge deficit in their leaders. This study of emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in military leaders could remedy the situation.
**Purpose Statement**

The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was three-fold. The first purpose was to identify the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force non-commissioned officers (NCO). The second purpose was to identify the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force commissioned officers. The final purpose was to determine if a statistically significant difference exists between the correlation coefficients for non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.

**Research Questions**

The following research questions guided the study:

1. What is the relationship between emotional intelligence, as measured by the Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS) (Wong and Law, 2002), and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) General Self-Efficacy (GSE) in non-commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force?

2. What is the relationship between emotional intelligence, as measured by the WLEIS (Wong and Law, 2002), and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) GSE in commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force?

3. What statistical difference exists between the correlation coefficients of emotional intelligence, as measured by the WLEIS (Wong and Law, 2002), and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) GSE
for commissioned and non-commissioned U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force officers?

**Significance of the Problem**

A better awareness of the significance of learning more about emotional intelligence as it relates to self-efficacy is needed for several reasons. Three of the most common ones noted from the literature, to include gaps in the literature, will be presented here.

First, the more emotionally intelligent the leader, the more likely will be his/her success in leading subordinates in garrison and in hostile environments.

Second, self-efficacy has been proven essential to actual achievement and success. Mission accomplishment is a military leader’s main function. If the leader and the leader’s subordinates are confident of success, the mission is exponentially more likely to be successful.

Finally, a better understanding of the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in military leaders may show if there is a benefit to the military in training and building either or both traits. If a difference is found in the correlational coefficients of non-commissioned vs. commissioned officers, that may assist the military in identifying where the training needs to occur.

There is currently a growing amount of information aimed at improving the emotional intelligence of people in the workplace. Studies have shown that emotional intelligence, more than IQ, determines the success rate of professionals and accounts for 58% of performance in all types of jobs (Bradberry & Greaves, 2009). The literature
states that while people’s intelligence quotient remains constant throughout their lives, they can improve their emotional intelligence quotient (Bradberry & Greaves, 2009).

In addition, there is a growing amount of literature dealing with self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is essential to actual achievement. Scholars have identified that high levels of emotional intelligence and self-efficacy are critical traits for a leader to possess (McKee, Boyatzis, & Johnston, 2008), and yet the literature shows that few studies have been conducted to find the correlation between these traits in military leadership. This study addressed any gaps in the literature and revealed the correlation between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in military leaders.

Two types of leaders exist in the military: NCOs and commissioned officers. The two types have different levels of responsibility, different training to prepare them for their responsibilities, and different requirements to achieve their ranks, and they are not allowed to fraternize with each other or enlisted personnel. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to predict different perspectives about leadership and possible different levels of emotional intelligence in these leaders. The difference in leadership perspectives combined with differences in emotional intelligence levels can affect their self-efficacy and their actual achievement and success as leaders. This study will therefore involve surveying non-commissioned and commissioned officers separately to determine if a statistically significant difference exists between the correlation coefficients for them.

**Definitions**

*NCOs.* NCOs are the enlisted pay grades of E-5 through E-9. The U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force have different names for the ranks in these pay grades, so this study will
refer to pay grades only. NCOs are considered the “backbone of the Army” (United States Army, 1999, p. A-1). Their authority comes from their oaths of office, law, rank structure, traditions, and regulations, which allows them to directly supervise soldiers. NCOs are responsible for soldier and unit readiness; they take care of the Army’s daily business. In addition to their daily duties, NCOs train and advise commanders on individual soldier and unit readiness, “Officers should consult their command sergeant major, first sergeant, or NCO assistant, before implementing policy” (United States Army, 1999, p. A-4). NCOs continually train their soldiers for the unexpected, rehearsing and preparing them for inspection. Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Rush (2010) stated in his book NCO Guide, “It is training and discipline (instilled by pride and training, maintained by good leadership) that keeps soldiers alive” (p. 52). The Army describes the NCO of today as:

An innovative, competent professional enlisted leader grounded in heritage, values, and tradition, who embodies the Warrior Ethos, champions continuous learning, and is capable of leading, training, and motivating soldiers; an adaptive leader who is proficient in joint and combined expeditionary warfare and continuous, simultaneous full spectrum operations, and resilient to uncertain and ambiguous environments. (as cited in Rush, 2010, p. 3)

Commissioned Officers. Commissioned officers are direct representatives of the President of the United States. The U.S. President appoints officers via a commission, which grants the officers legal authority to command, establish policy, and manage U.S. Army resources. Commissioned officers are the officer ranks of 0-1 through 0-11. Officers do not enlist; they take an oath and can resign their commissions at any time by
submitting a letter of resignation up their chain of command. Commissioned officers primarily deal with units and unit-level leadership, unlike the NCOs, who deal primarily with leadership at the individual level.

Emotional Intelligence. Bradberry and Greaves (2009) described the physical source of emotional intelligence as the communication between the rational part of the brain, the frontal lobe, and the emotional part of the brain, the limbic system. Emotional Intelligence is one’s awareness and mastery of one’s own emotions as well as the ability to recognize and understand the emotions of others.

Self-Efficacy. The dictionary defines efficacy as the capacity for producing a desired result. BusinessDictionary (n.d.) expands the definition of self-efficacy to: “A person’s belief about his or her ability and capacity to accomplish a task or to deal with the challenges of life” (Self-Efficacy section).

Delimitations

This study focused on leaders in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. For the purposes of this study, only service members with the pay grades of E-5 and above who were permanently or temporarily stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord were asked to complete the surveys. New leaders as well as seasoned leaders were encouraged to respond to the surveys, to allow for more diverse leadership perspectives.

Organization of the Study

Chapter I of this dissertation encompassed a statement of the problem and how the study would address the problem and attempt to answer the research questions. Chapter II was a review of the current literature related to this topic, initially with literature older than five years, and then with more current literature, in order to identify
where there was a gap in the literature. Chapter III then included an outline of the methodology used in gathering and analyzing data. Chapter IV reported the results of the survey with a statistical analyses of the findings. Chapter V outlined the findings related to the literature, conclusions drawn from the study, and recommendations for further research.
CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter addresses the variables of this study: military leadership, emotional intelligence, and self-efficacy. All major works, past and present, on the topics were explored and described in detail. The works were then compared and contrasted and any gaps in the literature identified.

A synthesis matrix was created to better identify and understand the research and information that has been produced on the topic. The synthesis matrix provides a detailed outline of the literature and its relevance to each of the topics addressed in this study (see Appendix A).

Past Writings on the Variables

Military Leadership

In a book published in 1967, *Taking Command*, West Point Military Academy’s leaders shared their insights on leadership with all of the services (Hays & Thomas, 1967). The editors of the book, both officers in the military, define leadership as, “The art of influencing human behavior so as to accomplish a mission in the manner desired by the leader” (Hays & Thomas, 1967, p. 27). They assist non-military readers by explaining that the military equivalents of top, middle, and supervisory management are field grade officer, company grade officer, and noncommissioned officer. The editors organized the book according to their concept of integrated leadership, which they describe as a balance of leader, followers, and the environmental situation.

Leaders. According to the editors, leaders cannot be easily classified by traits. The editor’s quote from two studies done on U.S. Air Force personnel that support the “Great Man” theory, or the belief that in order to be considered a “great man,” a person
must demonstrate outstanding leadership at a lower level, with a different group and under different circumstances (Hays & Thomas, 1967). The book does not use terms such as emotional intelligence, but it addresses “human relations,” pointing out that military leaders should not let personal problems and emotions interfere with their relationships with their subordinates. The editors go on to state that in order to maintain good relationships with their personnel, a leader must be willing to be introspective and identify his weaknesses and strengths (Hays & Thomas, 1967).

**The group.** Followers determine their leader as the person who is most able to satisfy their individual needs and guide them toward the group goals. Success on the part of the military leader may depend, therefore, on his ability to align the group’s goals with the mission the unit has been assigned to accomplish. Failure to do so could result in low unit morale or the emergence of an informal leader the group sees as more capable of fulfilling their goals (Hays & Thomas, 1967).

**The situation.** Hays and Thomas (1967) state clearly that leadership in the military may depend greatly on situational factors. They state that a man’s leadership capabilities may not show themselves until his unit is in combat and he takes the initiative to lead his unit to mission accomplishment. On the other hand, a successful leader in combat situations may be overly aggressive or authoritarian in garrison or training commands. A good military leader, therefore, must be able to flex his personality traits and leadership style to the situation and the external factors of the situation that may or not be within his control.

Echoing Hays and Thomas (1967) a book published almost 30 years later, *Military Leadership*, states, “Effective leaders seem to behave in ways that fit their
personalities, the situation, and the needs of the group that they are leading” (Taylor & Rosenbach, 1992, p. 172). The author of that chapter is not promoting a concept of integrated leadership so much as making the point that there is no one set of behaviors leaders can acquire to become effective. The author asserts that a more accurate method of evaluating a military leader’s effectiveness is by observing the success or failure of the leader’s unit. The organization’s success is proof that the leader chose the right behavior for that situation, with that group.

Some of the best military leaders throughout history have led their organizations to wild victories. One of the best ways to understand how those leaders accomplished their effectiveness is to study their teachings or what has been written about them.

Sun Tzu. In the first half of the 5th century B.C., a Chinese commander named Sun Tzu (2003) wrote The Art of War. These writings have long been considered the best work on war (Van Creveld, 2005, p. 224). Most of The Art of War deals with the strategy of battle with sections titled, “Strategic Assessments,” “Maneuvering Armies,” and “Terrain,” but a portion of his translated work focuses on leadership rather than strategy. This portion falls under the section “Mastering the Art of War” and is titled, “The Way of the General.” Here Tzu points out to the reader that the authority of the military comes from the authority of the general, or leader (Tzu, 2003). Tzu begins his advice on leadership with an admonishment to the leader to avoid association with people who are treacherous and immoral, although he admits, “Nothing is harder to see into than people’s natures” (Tzu, 2003, p. 221). Tzu goes on to describe the behavior of leaders and to show which types of leaders are the best. The traits he seems to value the most in leaders are: associating with the wise and promoting the able; being sincere, trustworthy and
magnanimous; being guarded in times of order or disturbance; and being a humanitarian and caring for the troops (Tzu, 2003). Many of Tzu’s teachings on military leadership originate with the philosopher Confucius, judging by the fact that he quotes the teachings of Confucius in his writings. Confucius advised that people should not be arrogant or stingy, and Tzu points out the problems that can occur if generals are arrogant or stingy. Confucius said, “To send people to war without teaching them is called abandoning them” (as cited in Tzu, 2003, p. 226) and Tzu includes that quote in his leadership section addressing the importance of training.

Tzu’s (2003) writings serve as a valuable reminder to present day military leaders that brilliant tactical strategy is not enough to ensure successful campaigns. Tzu, the most brilliant of tacticians, devotes a great deal of his writing to psychology, inspiration and reward, punishment, and care of the troops. Without using the term “emotional intelligence,” Tzu made it clear that military leaders must know themselves and others and must self-monitor to ensure that their behavior is beyond reproach.

The Drillmaster of Valley Forge. Baron Friedrich von Steuben of Prussia had a great impact on the American military during the American Revolutionary war. Steuben was known as the Drillmaster of Valley Forge. In 1779 Steuben adopted the military tactics of Jacques Antoine Guibert, which were seen as radical for those times, for the Continental Army (Lockhart, 2008). Steuben wrote what he called the Blue Book for new commanders, advising them on the best tactical procedures and also teaching them regulations for military conduct. The Baron was revolutionary in his understanding of field hygiene and the best way to lay out regimental camps to avoid infectious diseases.
In addition to practical and tactical advice, Steuben devoted the last third of the Blue Book to instructions on leadership.

Prussian officers had a reputation at the time for being harsh disciplinarians, but Steuben’s version of leadership was more that of a stern but protective father. Steuben advocated treating one’s soldiers with humanity, not being lenient or attempting to be their friend, but caring about their welfare and sharing their privations (Lockhart, 2008).

Clausewitz. In 1832, Carl von Clausewitz’s widow published his book on military strategy, *On War*. This book was seen as “the greatest Western work on war ever written” (Van Creveld, 2005, p. 13). Clausewitz was a Prussian staff officer whose talents for military theory were recognized enough that he was entrusted with teaching the Crown Prince about war. Later Clausewitz rose to the rank of general and commanded the Berlin staff college (Van Creveld, 2005).

*On War* to this day is required reading at U.S. military staff and war colleges. Van Creveld (2005) explains that Clausewitz’s (1976) work maintained its relevance because,

His is not an ordinary cookbook full of recipes concerning the utensils and ingredients which, correctly used, will yield certain foods; instead it contents itself with explaining the nature of cooking and the uses to which it is put, leaving readers to proceed on their own. (p. 114)

Chapter 3 of *On War* addresses military genius. Clausewitz (1976) stresses that he is not merely describing intelligence, that military genius is a combination of leadership traits that do not conflict with each other, although one may be stronger than another. The traits that comprise military genius, according to Clausewitz, are high
intellect, courage, and presence of mind (Clausewitz, 1976). Throughout his discussions on war, Clausewitz weaves a consistent thread – that war, no matter how much one plans for it, is unpredictable. He states,

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 102)

Clausewitz (1976) defines presence of mind as “Nothing but an increased capacity of dealing with the unexpected” (p. 103). He goes on to explain that strength of mind or character, more than mere intellect, can help a leader cope during times of violent emotion.

Dick Winters. Major Dick Winters led Easy Company, the unit immortalized as the Band of Brothers, from the invasion of Normandy to the capture of Hitler’s Eagle Nest in WWII. In his 2014 book, Conversations with Major Dick Winters, author Cole Kingseed (2014) shares with the readers Winters’ definition of leadership:

Leadership is difficult to define. They talk about leadership at West Point every day. Leadership starts with honesty, dedication, and having a man who is dependable and fair. If you never deviate from the standards that you established, men have faith in you and you’ll be out front to set the example. Sergeant Talbert once told me, “Sir, I’d follow you into hell!” I take a great deal of pride in his remark. (p. 65)
In a quote that lends credence to the integration concept of leadership communicated in *Conversations with Major Dick Winters: Life Lessons from the Commander of The Band of Brothers*, Winters also said, “I think I would have been effective in any airborne outfit, but Easy Company allowed me to excel. If you had anything good in you, E Company brought it out” (as cited in Kingseed, 2014, p. 67).

Easy Company and Major Winters were not an isolated example of courage and leadership; there were many heroes and great leaders who emerged in combat during World War II.

First Sergeant Len Lomell was the acting platoon leader of D Company, 2nd Ranger Battalion during the D-Day landing. Despite being shot in the side immediately after landing, Lomell led his platoon up the 100-foot cliffs of Pointe du Hoc and personally disabled a battery of 155-mm German coastal guns. Their success prevented the enemy from shelling the invasion forces below and the ships at sea.

East of Lomell’s location, Captain Joe Dawson landed on Omaha Beach with G Company. Dawson’s men encountered a chaotic mix of men and materiel on the beach, and Dawson moved to the front to take charge. Dawson destroyed the German machine gun position that was causing the chaos, and then continued to drive forward, penetrating the enemy defenses for the first time that day and preventing the Germans from killing hundreds of Americans on the beach below. Dawson and his unit later held a defensive position at Aachen for 39 days against overwhelming enemy numbers through intense combat. When interviewed later by a war correspondent, Dawson said,

How do you think I feel when I tell them there is no coming off the hill? They come in and say, ‘I can’t stand it any long. I can’t. I can’t’…and I take them by
the shirt and say… ‘you will…you will…you’ve got to stand it in spite of yourself,’ and what do they do? They go back up there and die. (as cited in Kolenda, 2001, p. 170)

Dawson was telling the correspondent about the tough decisions leaders have to make in combat, and the responsibility they carry to their subordinates.

Military leaders throughout history have had to work through and in spite of the emotional trials of war. In an interesting quote from Conversations with Major Dick Winters: Life Lessons from the Commander of The Band of Brothers, Major Dick Winters tells the author that it is important to, “Learn to feel and think with the head and not the heart” (Kingseed, 2014, p. 70). Winters did not say that a leader should learn not to feel; he said that a leader should learn to feel with the head. Perhaps without using the term, Major Winters was describing emotional intelligence.

**Emotional Intelligence**

One of the earliest descriptions of emotional intelligence was in the writings of Edward Thorndike in the 1930s, who together with Stein, described something called “social intelligence” (Thorndike & Stein, 1937). Thorndike and Stein (1937) were some of the earliest to study “intelligences,” and explained that social intelligence was one’s ability to understand people, including one’s self, by focusing on the perception of internal states. Thorndike and Stein recommended further research in order to find a more viable method to measure social intelligence than the verbal content they used.

There were further studies of intelligence and emotions over the next several decades, including Abraham Maslow (the famous humanistic psychologist who
developed Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs) describing how people can build their emotional strength.

The actual term “emotional intelligence” first appeared in 1985, in a dissertation written by Payne. Payne (1985) described emotional intelligence as, “a faculty of consciousness heretofore overlooked” (p. 9). In his work, Payne stated that many of the problems in the world were caused by people suppressing their emotions, and that emotion provides an important function in our lives. Instead of trying too hard to be “civilized,” Payne stated that people should instead endeavor to understand their emotions. Payne presented his dissertation as a guidebook for relating to emotions. He starts by exploring how the ancient philosophers such as the Stoics and the Cynics advocated for the suppression of emotion through one’s will. Stoicism greatly influenced western civilization, and it was widely believed until the 1800s, according to Payne, that the excessive expression of emotion was a sign of insanity. Payne concluded his first chapter with the statement, “It took us more than 300 years to discover the effects of smoking cigarettes; and it has taken us 2,500 years to discover the effects of suppressing emotion – and we are just beginning to explore this” (p. 32).

Payne (1985) went on to explain that there are three ways in which people suppress emotions: distracting themselves by directing their attention elsewhere; controlling their physical responses, such as facial expression; and by ingesting substances that will distract or anesthetize them from their feelings. The chief danger, Payne said, in suppressing emotions, is that it is not possible to suppress undesirable emotions without also suppressing the desirable ones. Payne said that it is possible, through developing one’s emotional intelligence, to change the way one responds
emotionally, but that, “It requires that you open up to the totality of your emotional experiences to achieve these changes” (p. 46). Payne continues in his guidebook by giving readers hope, saying essentially that if emotions have been suppressed, a transformation can take place leading to emotional intelligence. To find Payne’s ideas on developing emotional intelligence, the reader must sort through quotes from the I Ching and Kahlil Gibran, descriptions of different realities and psychological therapy techniques.

Emotional intelligence was first called Emotional Quotient and was abbreviated as EQ in a 1987 article by Keith Beasley, published in Mensa Magazine (Beasley, 1987). Beasley (1987) explained to the Mensa readers that EQ is a person’s ability to feel, while IQ is their ability to think, and that a person with high EQ is a person who is “easily moved” (p. 26). Beasley did not cite any research in his article, nor did he delve into EQ any more deeply than to state that people with high EQ are sensitive people, and that there are two factors to EQ – the ability to feel, and the ability to express those feelings. It was Beasley’s belief that some of the violence in the world results from people who are sensitive but do not know how to express their emotions constructively. He succeeded in forming a Special Interest Group (SIG) for EQ within Mensa UK to further explore his beliefs.

In 1990, Peter Salovey, psychologist and later President of Yale University (Social Psychology Network, n.d.) co-authored what became a landmark article with psychologist John Mayer, of University of New Hampshire (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). The article was titled simply, Emotional Intelligence. Salovey and Mayer (1990) did not
coin the term “emotional intelligence,” but they were some of the first psychologists to research and develop measurements of it (Practical Emotional Intelligence, n.d.).

Later that year, a psychologist and science reporter at The New York Times stumbled across Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) article written on emotional intelligence. He was so struck by the information that he began researching the topic and compiling the data. Goleman (1995) was determined to publicize the concept of emotional intelligence, and wrote the book *Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ*. Goleman has authored or co-authored many more books on the subject since then, making it his mission to spread knowledge of the concept throughout culture. This first book of Goleman’s introduces readers to the concept of managing emotions in order to control the brain’s “fight or flight” response to adrenaline. Goleman argues that unlike IQ, EQ can and should be developed in order to maintain healthy relationships with others and success in life.

One clue in Goleman’s (1995) book about the importance of emotional intelligence to leadership emerges in a passage titled, *Expressiveness and Emotional Contagion*. Goleman explains that emotions are contagious, that people unknowingly exchange emotions in subtle, imperceptible ways with every contact. He tells a true story about a platoon in Vietnam that was in a firefight with the Vietcong. In the middle of the firefight, six Buddhist monks started walking toward the line of fire. One of the American soldiers later reported that as the monks walked serenely through the line of fire, not looking right or left, all of the soldiers stopped shooting and quit fighting for the remainder of the day. Goleman theorizes that the “courageous calm” (p. 114) of the monks carried over to the soldiers, washing them in the same emotion. If leaders are able
to control their emotions, they can control the effect their emotions have on their subordinates. A leaders’ emotions can have a profound effect on the workplace.

Goleman published *Working with Emotional Intelligence* in 1998. In this work, he explains that being smart in the workplace is no longer enough, that “soft skills” are as important as technical skills (Goleman, 1998). In his section on self-mastery, Goleman tells his readers to listen to their intuition and “gut feelings” because they are messages from their internal stores of emotional memory, or wisdom they have gained from lessons learned. He goes on to explain that this self-awareness is the “foundation of three emotional competencies: emotional awareness; accurate self-assessment; and self-confidence” (Goleman, 1998, p. 54).

Emotional awareness is the ability to recognize one’s feelings and their effects on others. Goleman (1998) says that this is the fundamental emotional competence, and if people have it, they not only know their feelings, they can articulate them and know how to express them appropriately.

Accurate self-assessment is knowing one’s inner resources, abilities and limits. This requires honesty and perspective, and the ability to laugh at oneself if needed. Goleman (1998) points out that being aware of your weaknesses and where improvement is needed is crucial to superior performance.

Perhaps knowing one’s weaknesses can also lead to an acknowledgement of one’s strengths, which is necessary for self-efficacy.

**Self-Efficacy**

Albert Bandura is a social cognitive psychologist known for his research and writings on social learning theory and self-efficacy. He is ranked as the “most cited
living psychologist” (Cherry, 2016, para. 2). In the early 1960s Bandura began to explore the existing social learning theories and found that the principles of observational learning and vicarious reinforcement were missing an important element.

Bandura (1977) identified the missing element by introducing the term “self-efficacy” in an article he published in Psychological Review titled Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change. Bandura explained in the article that performance-based treatments of defensive or dysfunctional inhibitions were becoming the most effective. Specifically, Bandura cited his research into building efficacy in human subjects through four methods: “performance accomplishments; vicarious experience; verbal persuasion; and emotional arousal” (Bandura, 1977, p. 195).

It was Bandura’s (1977) assertion that people fear and avoid situations with which they do not feel capable of coping, and that they will expend effort and persist in the face of difficulty based on their perceived self-efficacy, which determines their perception of eventual success. Bandura’s experiments focused on which methods were most effective at building the self-efficacy of subjects. The fact that self-efficacy can be developed and maintained was in no doubt in the article; Bandura proved that fact in his research. He stated in the article that one of the most effective methods of building self-efficacy is through performance accomplishments, but that there must be the right balance between perceived ability to accomplish the task and expended effort. He stated, “To succeed at easy tasks provides no new information for altering one’s sense of self-efficacy, whereas mastering challenging tasks conveys salient evidence of enhanced competence” (Bandura, 1977, p. 201).
In one of his subsequent writings on the subject of self-efficacy, Bandura (1982) stated, “A capability is only as good as its execution…Perceived self-efficacy is concerned with judgments of how well one can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective situations” (p. 122). He goes on to explain that one’s self-appraisal of capabilities can determine a person’s behavior, thoughts, and emotional response to taxing situations. These self-efficacy judgments influence activities people choose as well as the level of effort they exert in the activities (Bandura, 1982).

In 1993, Bandura further explained that there are “four major processes involved in self-efficacy beliefs: Cognitive; motivational; affective and selection” (p. 118).

Cognitive processes are strongly influenced by self-efficacy beliefs. Bandura (1993) gives the example of personal goal setting – the stronger a person’s perceived self-efficacy, the higher the goals that person will set. Bandura explains that action is undertaken after forethought. People’s self-efficacy beliefs determine if they anticipate successful action or failure, and they act accordingly (Bandura, 1993). Bandura points out, “It is difficult to achieve much while one is fighting self-doubt” (p. 118).

Motivational processes are also governed by forethought. People form beliefs about what they can do, and if they anticipate positive outcomes these beliefs motivate them and guide their actions. Bandura (1993) breaks the motivational process down into more detailed categories and he explains that low self-efficacy, or a perceived low ability to exercise control, can result in depression.

Selection processes are about the choices people make based on their self-efficacy beliefs. People avoid activities they do not feel capable of handling, and they undertake challenges if they feel capable of handling them. Therefore, self-efficacy beliefs shape
the course of a person’s life through their chosen actions and environments (Bandura, 1993). In the article, Bandura (1993) gives examples of the power of self-efficacy in shaping people’s lives. One example was that of career choice – the more people believe in their efficacy, the more career choices they will consider, the more effort they will make in those careers, and therefore the more success they will achieve. Bandura (1993) gives a similar example with students, stating, “Children with the same level of cognitive skill development differ in their intellectual performance depending on the strength of their perceived self-efficacy” (p. 136).

Bandura (1997) combined some of his earlier studies and writings into a book titled *Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control*. In the book he continues his explanation of self-efficacy by making the point that skills can be undermined in a person by a lack of belief in their abilities. Belief in one’s ability can also vary in strength. Weak self-efficacy can be negated by failure or negative experiences, but strong self-efficacy can help a person to persevere in the face of adversity (Bandura, 1997).

Successes, according to Bandura (1997), build one’s self-efficacy. Failure, alternatively, undermines it. Too many successes, however, will cause a person to expect easy wins which could result in discouragement when encountering obstacles. The key to building resilient self-efficacy, says Bandura, is experience in overcoming obstacles through effort and perseverance. People need to learn that they can succeed if they persevere through difficulties. This can be achieved in teaching and training through mastery experiences (Bandura, 1997). Bandura (1997) also reports that studies have shown success in building self-efficacy through selective focus on personal attainments. People who focus on their past successes are more likely to have strong efficacious
beliefs, while people who focus on their failures tend to underestimate their abilities. Bandura addresses failures in more detail by saying, “Those who experience periodic failures but continue to improve over time are more apt to raise their sense of efficacy than those who succeed but see their performances leveling off compared to their prior rate of improvement” (p. 86).

Bandura (1997) makes the point early in his book that people’s beliefs in their capabilities do not always reflect reality. He writes, “People’s level of motivation, affective states, and actions are based more on what they believe than on what is objectively true” (Bandura, 1997, p. 2).

In their book *Self-Efficacy: Raising the Bar for all Students*, Eisenberger, Conti-D’Antonio and Bertrando (2005) explain Bandura’s work on self-efficacy, affirming that it is crucial for students to believe in their abilities to achieve successful schoolwork through sustained effort. The authors tell the readers, “Every child becomes more self-efficacious when they accomplish something they didn’t think they could. If you want mediocrity embrace self-esteem; if you want growth embrace self-efficacy” (Eisenberger, Conti-D’Antonio, & Bertrando, 2005, p. 7). The book goes on to describe strategies for teachers to use in order to build student self-efficacy and the academic success that comes with it.

Perhaps it is self-efficacy’s early foundations in social learning theory that caused the education community to embrace and further explore the concept. For the next decade numerous articles were written by academics and educators on self-efficacy’s influence on children’s ability to withstand peer pressure, achieve academic success, and deal with adolescence. In addition, the impact of teachers’ self-efficacy on their students
was explored, along with the impact self-efficacy has on the career planning of children and adolescents. What was not explored in the past literature was self-efficacy in most other fields.

**Writings on the Variables Published in the Last Five Years**

**Military Leadership**

The Department of Defense published a manual on leadership for officers in the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. It should be noted here that the U.S. Marine Corps falls under the Department of the Navy. There is no publication date for the manual, but from the language of the book, it can be surmised that it was written decades ago and has been revised and re-published through the years. There are two sections of the manual that address leadership.

The first leadership section of the manual makes the point that no two leaders are alike in attributes, and that at times the great qualities of a leader lay dormant or unobserved until the time they are needed. The first paragraphs seem to comfort military officers by telling them that there is no perfect combination of traits and behaviors that make a leader great. The manual states,

> While there are no perfect men, there are those who become relatively perfect leaders of men because something in their makeup brings out in strength the highest virtues of all who follow them. That is the way of human nature. Minor shortcomings do not impair the working loyalty, or growth, of the follower who has found someone whose strength he deems worth emulating. On the other hand, to recognize merit, you must yourself have it. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008, p. 60)
Captain Chesley B. “Sully” Sullenberger graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy and is a retired airline pilot. He is best known as the hero who landed a disabled airliner on the Hudson River in 2009. In his current role as a consultant, he compiled writings from civilian and military leaders on the subject of leadership and coauthored a book titled *Making a Difference: Stories of Vision and Courage from America’s Leaders* (Sullenberger & Century, 2012). Authors Sullenberger and Century (2012) explored some of Sullenberger’s experiences and in one story Sullenberger relates that as a child of a WWII Naval officer, he read every military book in his home and drew his ideas of leadership from leaders such as Churchill and Eisenhower. Sullenberger wrote, “This idea of genuine leadership – of intense preparation, rising to the occasion, meeting a specific challenge, setting clear objectives – was deeply internalized, burned into and ingrained in my young mind” (Sullenberger & Century, 2012, p. 2). His fascination with leadership led him to seek out some of the strongest leaders in the United States to ask them about their concepts of leadership.

Among the leaders Sullenberger and Century (2012) interviewed was Admiral Thad Allen, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant. Admiral Allen took on some of the most challenging roles in the country, such as being appointed the deputy director of FEMA one week after Hurricane Katrina struck Mississippi and Louisiana, and commanding the Coast Guard’s Atlantic forces after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, when all U.S. ports were potential targets. Admiral Allen told Sullenberger and Century that the Coast Guard’s principle of on-scene initiative is a vital part of his leadership philosophy. On-scene initiative means, “If you’re there, you have the capability, you should do something” (Sullenberger & Century, 2012, p. 15). The book quotes Admiral Allen as saying:
I always believe that you’re in control of events. I mean, you can’t control everything, but you have a great deal to do with what happens. People can do a lot of things to you, but they can’t mess with your mental attitude. You own that and you control it. (Sullenberger & Century, 2012, p. 32)

Another leader featured in the book is William Bratton, who was appointed the thirty-eighth commissioner of the New York Police Department in 1993. Within three years Bratton led his team to reducing crime in New York significantly, transforming it into one of the safest cities in the world. Bratton told Sullenberger and Century (2012) that he considers himself a transformational leader and change agent and believes that a leader needs to have a vision and get others to embrace that vision.

Lieutenant Colonel Tammy Duckworth was an officer in the Illinois National Guard when she was mobilized to serve in Iraq with her Assault Helicopter Battalion. While co-piloting a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter in formation with another Black Hawk, her helicopter was hit by sniper fire. Within minutes Lieutenant Colonel Duckworth’s Black Hawk was damaged and on the ground, and she was badly wounded. The second Black Hawk landed, and the crews maintained security while rescuing their injured. Her crew thought she was dead, but brought her with them anyway, recovering what they thought was her lifeless body. They then saw minute signs of life and rendered first aid, saving her life. When they reached medical care, the crew members refused treatment until Duckworth was taken care of, and when she regained consciousness her questions were all for the safety of her men. In spite of losing both of her legs and one arm, Lieutenant Colonel Duckworth said, “They thought I was dead, and yet they recovered my body. Not a day goes by where I don’t set the standard of ‘I’m never going
to do anything that would dishonor their actions on that day’” (Sullenberger & Century, 2012, p. 94).

Gene Kranz was the flight director at Houston’s Mission Control during the Apollo 11 lunar landing, and again during the Apollo 13 mission that almost ended in tragedy. His leadership during those times earned him the Presidential Medal of Honor. According to Kranz, his first taste of leadership was not those momentous events, but a smaller test during his college years (as cited in Sullenberger & Century, 2012). Kranz was president of his fraternity when a black man applied for membership, which was an unheard-of event on a campus that still practiced racial segregation. Kranz said that he understood the implications of his decision, but that he felt that he had to do the right thing and elect him into the fraternity (as cited in Sullenberger & Century, 2012). Kranz told Sullenberger and Century (2012), “You must stand for something and your feelings must be strong and you must be willing to challenge yourself, to go through any obstacles or difficulties in order to achieve your objective” (p. 150).

General Stanley McChrystal (2013), the former commanding officer of all United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan, retired from the U.S. Army in 2010 and is now a senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. He is also the cofounder of the McChrystal Group, a leadership consulting firm.

In the memoir General McChrystal (2013) published, he addresses leadership, stating that all he learned about the topic was most likely still “not enough” (p. 391). Leadership, he is convinced, is the single biggest reason organizations succeed or fail. “Switch just two people – the battalion commander and the command sergeant major – from the best battalion with those of the worst, and within ninety days the relative
effectiveness of the battalions will have switched as well” (McChrystal, 2013, p. 391). He shares his insight into leadership with the readers, saying that leadership is neither good nor evil, it is simply the art of influencing others and getting them to go where they do not want to go. General McChrystal writes that leaders may not be popular, but if they win, people will recognize their effectiveness and follow them. He says that good leaders are empathetic and genuine, and that superficial attributes like looks and charisma can appear to be leadership, but only for a time. If a leader does not have the honest, deeper attributes his people will not be fooled (McChrystal, 2013).

James Murphy (2014), a former U.S. Air Force F-15 fighter pilot and CEO of a leadership consulting firm, agrees with General McChrystal’s (2013) views on leadership. Murphy explains in his 2014 book, *Courage to Execute*, that a leader must ensure that everyone in the organization understands his intent and vision, and he describes General McChrystal’s leadership in Afghanistan as the perfect example of this. He writes, “General McChrystal had to put high definition around the future he wanted for Afghanistan. That detailed concept enabled all his troops to act better, target better, and deploy processes more effectively. You need this in business, too” (Murphy, 2014, p. 54).

Murphy (2014) sums up his principles of leadership in a checklist. Leaders, he writes:

- Take responsibility: A team owns success; a leader owns failure.
- Enforce accountability for themselves and their team members.
- Model an appropriate example.
- Reinforce standards and processes.
• Cultivate situational awareness.
• Listen actively.
• Facilitate collaboration.
• Delegate, trust, and develop leadership in others.
• Orchestrated mutual support.
• Thank and reward team members. (p. 148)

Dr. John Medley (2014), Sergeant Major (retired), in his memoir describes leaders he encountered through his career in the U.S. Army Finance Corps. The qualities he admired in these leaders echo those lauded by other military leadership writers. He describes two officers in this way, “They were hardworking, trusting leaders with a vision, high expectations, and unwavering standards...They communicated with confidence, courage, and obvious intelligence characterized by determination and resilience” (Medley, 2014, p. 247).

Vision is again mentioned by a military leader, Colonel Jill Morgenthaler (2015) in her book, Courage to Take Command. Colonel Jill Morgenthaler, one of the first women to serve in the U.S. Army, freely admits in her memoir that as a new leader she had to follow her father’s advice and “fake it till you make it” (p. 27). Time and experience taught her leadership lessons that she shared in her book, and they include the advice to leaders to provide the vision to their followers. She states, “If you can show people why you are doing what you are doing and where you are going, they are more than likely going to follow you” (Morgenthaler, 2015, p. 27). She adds to that advice the importance of visualizing yourself as a leader. She points out, “If you don’t buy it, who else will?” (Morgenthaler, 2015, p. 27).
Emotional Intelligence

Harvard Business Review (2015) gathered writings on the topic of emotional intelligence from some of the foremost experts on the topic, creating a reference book that not only combines the expertise of 20 leading researches in the field but also provides practical and authentic insight for novice to expert. Contributing author Goleman starts off this book with a chapter titled, What Makes a Leader? Goleman asserts that more than IQ and technical skills, great leaders are those with high emotional intelligence. He explains that emotional intelligence skills are self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills, and that these can be developed through “persistence, practice, and feedback from colleagues or coaches” (Harvard Business Review, 2015, p. 3). In chapter 2 of the book, Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee contribute Primal Leadership: The Hidden Driver of Great Leadership Performance. They reiterate Goleman’s earlier concept of mood contagion, or the fact that a leader’s emotions will drive the emotions of those around him (Harvard Business Review, 2015). They point out that a leader must self-monitor and adjust to the needs of the organization.

One method of self-monitoring that is outlined in the book is the practice of building emotional agility. Contributing authors David and Congleton offer the idea in their chapter titled Emotional Agility: How Effective Leaders Manage Their Negative Thoughts and Feelings that good leaders are not controlled by their natural inner thoughts of failure or negativity; they instead build their emotional agility by practicing four processes: Recognize your patterns; label your thoughts and emotions; accept them; and act on your values (as cited in Harvard Business Review, 2015).
The four processes for building one’s emotional agility, as outlined by David and Congleton are:

- **Recognizing your patterns** means that leaders need to realize when their thought patterns have become repetitive and they have become stuck in them.

- **Labeling your thoughts and emotions** means that a leader is able to “step back” from their thoughts and label them so as to recognize them as helpful or destructive. For instance, if a leader thinks, “They’re not giving me the respect I deserve,” he needs to label that as, “I’m having the thought that they’re not giving me the respect I deserve.” This leads to the next step in the process.

- **Accept them** means a leader should then keep an open mind about the thoughts, allowing time to experience them and find out if they are a sign that something is at stake and action needs to be taken.

- **Acting on your values** is the final step of emotional agility. It means that a leader has carefully considered his emotions and before acting will consider if the action will best serve the organization and be true to his values. (as cited in Harvard Business Review, 2015)

In 2014 Miller published a book called *Emotional Intelligence*. Though small by most standards, the book goes beyond identifying emotional intelligence; it offers a great deal of practical advice for building emotional intelligence and applying it to life challenges such as conflict resolution. Miller (2014) addresses useful topics in his book such as how to identify and deal with emotional triggers, keys to commanding your emotions, setting boundaries, and mastering interpersonal skills.
Bradberry and Greaves’ *Emotional Intelligence 2.0* was published in 2009, but includes a new and enhanced online edition of a popular emotional intelligence test. This test has served many people by helping to accurately assess their emotional intelligence levels. Talent Smart, the publisher of the book, also has a website that test takers can then use to set goals for their emotional intelligence growth. Like Miller’s (2014) book, *Emotional intelligence 2.0* offers useful strategies for building one’s emotional intelligence, including an action plan framework to guide the reader on their journey (Bradberry & Greaves, 2009).

**Self-Efficacy**

In their bestselling book on change, C. Heath and Heath (2011) address the role self-efficacy plays in the ability to achieve change. Specifically, C. Heath and Heath discuss Bandura and Schunk’s research with elementary school kids and arithmetic. The study showed that the children given distant goals to complete solved only 45% of the problems, while the group given smaller, attainable goals completed 81% of the problems (as cited in C. Heath & Heath, 2011, p. 280). The study clearly showed Bandura’s concept that self-efficacy is built through a series of hard-won successes. C. Heath and Health (2011) use this study as an example of why one should attempt to “shrink” the change before attempting it, setting oneself up for success, which can then lead to more self-efficacy and further successes.

In his book about building self-confidence, Tracy (2012) only addresses the concept of self-efficacy in one area – that of differentiating between self-esteem and self-confidence. Tracy defines self-esteem as “How you feel about yourself and your abilities” and self-efficacy as “performance-based self-esteem” (p. 43).
Another book on confidence, Kelsey’s (2013) *Being More Confident*, devotes an entire chapter to self-efficacy. Kelsey gives the usual definitions of self-efficacy, and points out that self-efficacy is “competence with added self-belief” (p. 70) and that the two need to be in balance. The point that Kelsey makes is that self-efficacy is a “major requirement for confidence” (p. 70) and that it can be learned. He then outlines Bandura’s four potential sources of self-efficacy: experience; modelling; social persuasions; and physiological factors (Kelsey, 2013, p. 70). Kelsey ends the chapter by saying, “Self-efficacy is belief and competence combined, and is a key attribute of the confident, making its acquisition worth the effort. Yet it remains domain-specific, as does talent – which is nearly always a result of endeavour” (p. 77).

In a small book titled, *Confidence: How to Overcome Your Limiting Beliefs and Achieve Your Goals*, Meadows (2015) focuses entirely on self-efficacy. Meadows explains the concept of self-efficacy, why it is important, the fact that it is task-specific, and then lists five common characteristics of people with a strong sense of self-efficacy: They consider challenges as something they can overcome and master; they persevere in the face of difficulties; they take responsibility for their failures and believe they can control the outcome; they put more effort into completing a task; and they commit to their goals (Meadows, 2015).

As Tracy (2012) did, Meadows (2015) differentiates between self-efficacy and self-esteem, and he adds, “Even if you’re good at something, your lack of self-worth might make you think you’re still inferior to others” (Meadows, 2015, p. 14). Meadows devotes the rest of the book to Bandura’s four factors that influence self-efficacy: mastery experiences; social modeling; social persuasion; and psychological responses.
Summary

Integration of Themes

The writings on emotional intelligence and self-efficacy tend to show the same themes with only slight variations or added details. This is not surprising as the current writings are strongly influenced by the giants in each field. Goleman’s (1995) work on emotional intelligence and Bandura’s studies and writings on self-efficacy paved the way for many of today’s experts.

Writings on emotional intelligence agree that:

- Emotional intelligence, unlike IQ, can be developed through training and practice
- Strong Emotional intelligence skills ensure better success in the workplace
- Leadership ability depends upon Emotional intelligence skills

Writings on self-efficacy state that:

- Self-efficacy can be developed through training and practice
- Strong self-efficacy ensures task accomplishment
- Self-efficacy is affected by emotional intelligence
- The stronger one’s SE, the more effort one will exert toward a task

The writings on military leadership, however, may discuss some of the same attributes of leadership, but they show no discernible themes, other than the assertion that no one person has all of the answers and all leaders are human. Perhaps common language and themes related to emotional intelligence and self-efficacy would help military leaders focus on building these attributes.
Summary of Major Trends

Great leaders have existed throughout history in the military. Leadership has been studied, and military leadership has been valued as essential to mission accomplishment and survival. The writings on military leadership identify desirable traits in leaders, with some of the common ones being courage, integrity, empathy, and decisiveness. Many more are identified in different writings by different names.

The concepts of emotional intelligence and self-efficacy, however, have not been addressed by name or specific reference in the writings on military leadership. Certainly, some attributes of good leaders could be classified as those possessed by a person with high emotional intelligence, but that term has not been used. Self-efficacy is also not used, although confidence is. Belief in one’s abilities, faking that belief, and fostering belief in one’s subordinates, are necessary in the military profession, but military leaders are not given the tools to build self-efficacy.
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

Overview

This study focused on the variables of emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in two different groups: non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord.

This chapter describes the purpose of the study, research questions, and research design used in the study. This chapter also describes the population and sample of the study. In addition, the instrumentation used in the study and the validity and reliability of the instruments are defined. Finally, this chapter explains the collection and analysis of the data for the study as well as the study limitations.

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was three-fold. The first was to identify the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in U.S. Army and Air Force NCOs.

The second purpose was to identify the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in U.S. Army and Air Force commissioned officers.

The final purpose was to determine if a significant difference exists between the correlation coefficients for non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and Air Force.

Research Questions

The following research questions guided the study:

1. What is the relationship between emotional intelligence, as measured by the

Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS) (Wong & Law, 2002)

2. What is the relationship between emotional intelligence, as measured by the WLEIS (Wong & Law, 2002) and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) GSE in commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force?

3. What statistical difference exists between the correlation coefficients of emotional intelligence, as measured by the WLEIS (Wong & Law, 2002) and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) GSE for commissioned and non-commissioned U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force officers?

**Research Design**

Because the purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to determine the relationship between the variables of emotional intelligence and self-efficacy, the research was non-experimental and correlational. Non-experimental research examines relationships without active or direct intervention of the conditions (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The researcher had no direct contact with the research participants; data was collected via anonymous surveys sent through an intermediary.

There are two primary correlational research designs: explanatory and prediction. Explanatory design describes the association between or among variables and is typically used when the study is mainly quantitative, as this study is (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). Correlational research was appropriate for this study because it is the best method
to study relationships between phenomena (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010) and between separate population samples.

A statistical comparison of the correlation coefficient allowed the researcher to ascertain if a relationship exists between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in military leaders and to what degree it exists. In addition to the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in leaders, the researcher sought to determine if there is a difference between the levels of emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in non-commissioned officers versus commissioned officers. In studying these relationships, the researcher hoped to provide useful information for the improved training of these military leaders.

**Population**

A population is the group of people from which a sample is drawn (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The population for this study was non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. The ranks and branches of service are highlighted in yellow as illustrated in Table 1.

The target population for this study was non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force who were stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) in Tacoma, Washington. Approximately 2,371 NCOs live in on-post housing, and approximately 480 officers live in on-post housing, according to the JBLM Public Affairs Office. Those 2,851 leaders represent approximately 30% of the JBLM active duty population. It was estimated, therefore, that of the total 33,000 service members stationed at JBLM, approximately 9,550 were E-5s and above.
JBLM is home to approximately 33,000 service members and is a training and mobilization center for all branches of the service. Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base consolidated in 2010. The base is comprised of approximately 32 major Air Force units and 34 major Army units (Military Installations, 2015, "Get to know JBLM").

Table 1

**Ranks and Branches in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay Grade</th>
<th>Army N</th>
<th>Army %</th>
<th>Navy N</th>
<th>Navy %</th>
<th>Marine Corps N</th>
<th>Marine Corps %</th>
<th>Air Force N</th>
<th>Air Force %</th>
<th>Total DoD N</th>
<th>Total DoD %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>18,472</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>11,522</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>9,807</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>7,207</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>47,008</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>26,786</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>16,451</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>18,668</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>3,973</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>65,678</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>53,096</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>46,796</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>44,275</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>46,315</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>190,482</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>118,406</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>54,144</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>38,749</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>57,402</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>268,701</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>74,398</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>62,256</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>27,139</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>63,582</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>227,375</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>60,502</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>46,057</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>14,597</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>38,582</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>159,738</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td>39,407</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>21,062</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>8,281</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>25,939</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>94,149</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>12,019</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>6,299</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3,887</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>5,136</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>27,351</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>3,613</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2,572</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1,564</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2,508</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>10,257</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Enlisted** 406,699 (80.6%) 267,159 (83.1%) 166,977 (88.9%) 250,104 (80.0%) 1,090,939 (82.3%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay Grade</th>
<th>W1 N</th>
<th>W1 %</th>
<th>W2 N</th>
<th>W2 %</th>
<th>W3 N</th>
<th>W3 %</th>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2,239</td>
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<td>547</td>
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<td>837</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7,957</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
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<td>624</td>
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<td>616</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>5,271</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
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<td>W4</td>
<td>2,240</td>
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<td>415</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2,944</td>
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<tr>
<td>W5</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Total W1-W5** 15,467 (3.1%) 1,662 (0.5%) 2,101 (1.1%) N/A N/A 19,250 (1.5%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay Grade</th>
<th>O1 N</th>
<th>O1 %</th>
<th>O2 N</th>
<th>O2 %</th>
<th>O3 N</th>
<th>O3 %</th>
<th>O4 N</th>
<th>O4 %</th>
<th>O5 N</th>
<th>O5 %</th>
<th>O6 N</th>
<th>O6 %</th>
<th>O7 N</th>
<th>O7 %</th>
<th>O8 N</th>
<th>O8 %</th>
<th>O9 N</th>
<th>O9 %</th>
<th>O10 N</th>
<th>O10 %</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>O1</td>
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<td>6,906</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6,529</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>23,539</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>O2</td>
<td>12,740</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>6,339</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3,609</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>7,193</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>29,881</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>O3</td>
<td>29,295</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>18,275</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>6,756</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>21,974</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>76,300</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>O4</td>
<td>17,375</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>10,849</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3,869</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>13,584</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>45,677</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>O5</td>
<td>9,771</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>6,858</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>9,462</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>28,015</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>O6</td>
<td>4,321</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>3,323</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3,316</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>11,654</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>O7</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>O8</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>96</td>
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<td>306</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>O9</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>145</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>O10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>38</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Total O1-O10** 82,144 (16.3%) 52,778 (16.4%) 18,813 (10.0%) 62,349 (20.0%) 216,864 (16.3%)

**Total Officers** 97,631 (19.4%) 54,440 (16.9%) 20,914 (11.1%) 62,349 (20.0%) 235,334 (17.7%)

**Total** 504,330 (100.0%) 321,599 (100.0%) 187,891 (100.0%) 321,453 (100.0%) 1,326,273 (100.0%)

*Note. Adapted from “2015 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community” by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2014. Copyright 2014 by the Department of Defense, United States of America. aThe Air Force does not have warrant officers. bPercentages may not total to 100 due to rounding.*
Sample

The sample of a study is a group of subjects from whom the data are collected (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). Purposive sampling occurs when subjects with certain characteristics are chosen to be representative of the population (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). In this study, non-commissioned and commissioned officers who were stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord were selected to receive the anonymous surveys.

For correlational studies, a minimum of 30 responses (completed surveys) is needed (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The researcher acquired a minimum of 30 completed surveys from the non-commissioned officer ranks and 30 completed surveys from the commissioned officer ranks.

Sample Selection Process

The researcher worked with a retired service member who works as a civilian on JBLM to access an established email distribution list of non-commissioned and commissioned officers. Via the email distribution list, all non-commissioned and commissioned officers stationed at JBLM were invited to participate in the study. From the completed surveys, a minimum of 30 responses from each group were randomly chosen for analysis.

As part of the survey, each participant was requested to complete the informed consent form. All participants were notified that responses to the research would be kept confidential. No individual responses were identifiable, and all responses and data for the study were kept in a password protected electronic file to which the researcher has
sole access. All data collected will be destroyed five years after this dissertation is published.

**Instrumentation**

This study involved using two well-established and validated instruments: The WLEIS and the GSE.

There are a total of 16 items and four factors in the WLEIS measurement scale. The factors are “self-emotion appraisal,” “others’ emotion appraisal,” “use of emotion,” and “regulation of emotion.” Each factor is measured with a total of four questions.

The WLEIS uses a 7-point Likert scale for the answers with values of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) (see Appendix B).

The GSE, a 10 item psychometric scale, was used to measure self-efficacy. The tool is designed to assess an individual’s optimistic belief in his or her own ability to cope with daily work stressors, and to measure the person’s ability to deal with obstacles or setbacks (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995).

The response options are: 1 = *Not at all true*; 2 = *Hardly true*; 3 = *Moderately true*; 4 = *Exactly true* (see Appendix C).

The architects of the scale state that it is preferable to administer the GSE as part of a larger questionnaire, mixing the 10 questions in with other items that have the same response format. This survey, administered through Survey Monkey, consisted of two parts, the first addressing self-efficacy, and the second addressing emotional intelligence.

**Validity and Reliability**

The WLEIS has reported good internal consistency, reliability, and validity. The four dimensions of the WLEIS reported internal reliability alphas of .86, .85, .79, and .82,
respectively, for both supervisor and subordinate responses (Awadzi-Calloway, 2010). In a separate study of the reliability of the scale, the loads of the factors were found to be between 0.83-0.85, 0.74-0.89, 0.76-0.82, 0.66-0.83 respectively (Aslan & Ahmet, 2008, p. 433).

The GSE scale has been used internationally for over two decades and has received top marks in reliability and validity. The General Perceived Self-Efficacy (GPSS) was re-named the GSE and has maintained its high internal consistencies, with Cronbach ratings from .75 to .90, with the majority in the high .80s. The scale is unidimensional (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). Permission to use the GSE for research without the intent of profit is not required.

Data Collection

Prior to any data collection, the researcher obtained approval from the Brandman University Institutional Review Board (BUIRB) to conduct the study. The BUIRB consent is included as Appendix D. The rights and privacy of all participants were protected throughout the study.

The researcher contacted survey respondents via an intermediary for the purposes of this study. The intermediary forwarded the survey via existing email distribution lists to all eligible participants. This was meant to ensure anonymity and cost efficiency. The survey required fewer than 10 minutes to complete. The researcher then received permission from the legal office of Joint Base Lewis-McChord to solicit anonymous survey responses from base leaders via an advertisement in the base newspaper. After a modification application to BUIRB was approved (see Appendix E), the researcher purchased the advertisement in order to encourage more survey participation. The
researcher acquired a minimum of 30 responses from the non-commissioned officer ranks and 30 responses from the commissioned officer ranks.

**Data Analysis**

Data was collected using the measurement tools previously discussed. Survey responses were transferred to the Statistical Analysis Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Microsoft Excel. The SPSS analysis included descriptive statistics to show characteristics of the sample group and relativity to the population. It also included correlations, reliability tests, and multiple regressions.

A correlation coefficient is a number calculated to show the strength of the relationship between variables (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). Correlation between variables was determined for this study using the Pearson product-moment coefficient for individual comparisons. This is the best method to use when both variables use continuous scales, as with self-concept inventories (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). Multiple regression analysis was used when discovering the strength of correlation between multiple variables.

Finally, for Research Question (RQ) 3, significant differences were determined by the use of T-tests to measure differences between individual groups and by the use of analysis of variance to measure the degree of difference between multiple groups.

**Limitations**

One constraint of this study involved the sample size and response rate. For a study to be valid and reliable, a large enough population and sample were needed to facilitate a response rate of at least 30 per group. This relatively small sample size from
one base may have affected the generalizability of the study to the overall U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.

In addition, access to the target population had to be achieved through permission from the base authorities and executed via an intermediary. The military did not wish to give personal information about their members, such as email addresses, to a member of the public, so the survey was sent through an intermediary to the sample group. This method proved unsatisfactory, and special permission had to be received from the base authorities and BUIRB for the researcher to post the survey link and request to participate in a paid advertisement in the base newspaper.

Finally, there was no way to ensure that participants answered survey questions honestly and without bias. Although the researcher ensured that participants’ responses would remain anonymous, some participants could have chosen responses on the survey that did not reflect their true feelings. As a result, the data acquired from the surveys might or might not be indicative of what the participants were truly feeling.
CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH, DATA COLLECTION, AND FINDINGS

Overview

This chapter presents the findings from the analysis of the data obtained from the responses to an anonymous survey given to leaders who served on Joint Base Lewis McChord. The chapter begins with a review of the purpose of the study, the research questions, and study methodology. This is followed by the presentation of findings by research question, and the chapter concludes with a summary of findings overall.

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was three-fold. The first purpose was to identify the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force NCOs. The second purpose was to identify the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force commissioned officers. The final purpose was to determine if a statistically significant difference exists between the correlation coefficients for non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.

Research Questions

The following research questions guided the study:

1. What is the relationship between emotional intelligence, as measured by the Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS) (Wong and Law, 2002), and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) General Self-Efficacy (GSE) in non-commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force?
2. What is the relationship between emotional intelligence, as measured by the WLEIS (Wong and Law, 2002), and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) GSE in commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force?

3. What statistical difference exists between the correlation coefficients of emotional intelligence, as measured by the WLEIS (Wong and Law, 2002), and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) GSE for commissioned and non-commissioned U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force officers?

**Research Methods and Data Collection Procedures**

The researcher contacted base leaders via an intermediary for the purposes of this study. The researcher emailed the intermediary a link to the anonymous survey, and the intermediary then forwarded the survey via existing email distribution lists to all eligible participants. The base authorities were not happy with the email being sent through existing military email distribution lists, but once they determined that the researcher did not have access to those distribution lists’, they were reassured. The researcher received permission from the legal office of Joint Base Lewis-McChord to solicit anonymous survey responses from base leaders via a paid advertisement in the base newspaper. A Request for Modification was approved by the BUIRB, allowing the researcher to collect data in this manner.

The researcher acquired a minimum of 30 responses from the non-commissioned officer ranks and 30 responses from the commissioned officer ranks.
Population

A population is the group of people from which a sample is drawn (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The population for this study was non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.

The target population for this study was non-commissioned officers with the pay grade of E-5 and above, and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) in Tacoma, Washington.

Sample

The sample of a study is a group of subjects from whom the data are collected (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). Purposive sampling occurs when subjects with certain characteristics are chosen to be representative of the population (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). In this study, non-commissioned and commissioned officers who were stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord were selected to receive the anonymous surveys.

Demographic Data

Due to the sensitivity of the study’s participants to breaches of privacy, the only demographic data collected were ranges of ranks. Further identifying information may have negatively impacted the response rate.

NCOs comprised 59.5% of the respondents, with a total response of 50. Commissioned officers comprised 40.5% of the respondents, with a total response of 34 (see Table 2).
Table 2

**Pay Grades of Study Participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-5 or E-6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7 through E-9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1 through O-3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above O-3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Presentation and Analysis of Data**

**Findings for RQ 1**

*What is the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in non-commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force?*

The self-efficacy scores of the NCOs ranged from 29 to 40 with a mean of 35.85 (SD = 3.36). The maximum score of the GSE is 40, so the mean indicated that the NCOs were high overall in self-efficacy. For emotional intelligence, the maximum mean was 7.0. Both the overall emotional intelligence and sub-scales of emotional intelligence were examined (see Table 3).

Table 3

**NCOs’ Mean Self-Efficacy and Emotional Intelligence Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>35.85</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOE</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. SEA = self-emotions appraisal; OEA = others-emotions appraisal; UOE = use of emotion; ROE = regulation of emotion.*
For this study, the focus was on the first row comparing the self-efficacy with the emotional intelligence scores and sub-scales. The remaining correlations looked at the relationships among the various EI scales, and as expected, the EI subscales correlated with each other.

Looking at the individual components in Table 4, the following can be observed:

1. The EI-ROE correlations with emotional intelligence (.90), SEA (.76), OEA (.68), and UOE (.82) all fall in the strong category for correlation, meaning the findings for ROE and emotional intelligence are strong. All of these results are accurate at the p<.01 level, meaning the findings for ROE are very accurate. The stand alone is the self-eEfficacy (.20) comparison with a low strength of correlation and an insignificant degree of accuracy. Overall, ROE is a strength NCOs possess, but it does not correlate with their self-efficacy.

2. The EI-UOE correlation with emotional intelligence (.71), falls in the strong category for correlation, while self-efficacy (.31), SEA (.40), and OEA (.48) fall into the moderately strong correlation category, meaning the findings for emotional intelligence are strong and the findings for the other categories are moderately strong. The results for emotional intelligence, SEA, and OEA are accurate at the p<.01 level meaning the findings for these categories of Use of Emotion are very accurate. The correlation between self-efficacy and EI are significant at the .05 level, making them accurate at a significant level. Overall, UOE is reasonably strong.

3. The EI-OEA correlations with self-efficacy (.29), EI (.57), and SEA (.25) show a moderately strong correlation with emotional intelligence and weak
correlations with self-efficacy and SEA. EI is accurate at the .01 level, and self-efficacy is accurate at the .05 level making the accuracy of both findings strong. Overall, OEA has a moderately strong correlation with self-efficacy.

4. The EI-SEA correlations with self-efficacy (-.07), and EI (.59) are weak negatively and moderately strong, respectively. The EI is accurate at the .01 level while the self-efficacy accuracy is not significant. Overall, SEA is not strong compared to self-efficacy but is moderately strong when compared to emotional intelligence.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EI</th>
<th>EI-SEA</th>
<th>EI-OEA</th>
<th>EI-UOE</th>
<th>EI-ROE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>.90**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.76**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>.68**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.82**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *p < .05; ** p < .01; SEA = self-emotions appraisal; OEA = others-emotions appraisal; UOE = use of emotion; ROE = regulation of emotion.

Findings for RQ 2

What is the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force?

As seen in Table 5, officers scored high in the means of both self-efficacy an emotional intelligence.
Table 5

*Officers’ Mean Self-Efficacy and Emotional Intelligence Scores*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35.88</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOE</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* SEA = self-emotions appraisal; SEA= others-emotions appraisal; OEA = use of emotion; UOE = regulation of emotion.

Looking at the individual components of Table 6, the following can be observed:

1. The EI-ROE correlations with EI (.86), OEA (.70), and UOE (.84) all fall in the strong category for correlation, meaning the findings for ROE and EI are strong. ROE’s correlation with SEA (.46) is moderately strong. All of these results are accurate at the p<.01 level meaning the findings for ROE are very accurate. The self-eEfficacy correlation with ROE was (.56), which is moderately strong. Overall, ROE is a strength.

2. The EI-UOE correlation with emotional intelligence (.69) falls in the strong category for correlation, while self-efficacy (.46), and OEA (.45) fall into the moderately strong correlation category, meaning the findings for emotional intelligence are strong and the findings for the other categories are moderately strong. The correlation with UOE and SEA (.11) is weak. The results for EI, SEA, and OEA are accurate at the p<.01 level meaning the findings for these categories of UOE are very accurate. The correlation between self-efficacy and UOE are significant at the .05 level, making them accurate at a significant level. Overall, UOE is reasonably strong.
3. The EI-OEA correlation with EI (.52), is moderately strong, while there are only weak correlations with self-efficacy (.05), and SEA (.12).

4. The EI-SEA correlations with self-efficacy (.62) is moderately strong, while the correlation with EI (.23) is weak.

Table 6

**Correlation of Self-Efficacy and Emotional Intelligence among Officers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EI</th>
<th>EI-SEA</th>
<th>EI-OEA</th>
<th>EI-UOE</th>
<th>EI-ROE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.69**</td>
<td>.86**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td></td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td></td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.70**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOE</td>
<td></td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; SEA = self-emotions appraisal; OEA = others-emotions appraisal; UOE = use of emotion; ROE = regulation of emotion.*

Findings for RQ 3

*What statistical difference exists between the correlation coefficients of emotional intelligence and self-efficacy for commissioned and non-commissioned U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force officers?*

The intent of RQ 3 was to explore whether survey results would differ significantly between NCOs and commissioned officers in either emotional intelligence or self-efficacy. In addition, data were analyzed to determine if significant differences existed between the correlation coefficients for each group.

An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine if there was a significant difference between NCOs and officers on the scales. As seen in Table 7, no significant differences were found between the groups.
Table 7

Comparing Self-Efficacy and Emotional Intelligence between NCOs and Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NCOs</th>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td>35.85</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>35.88</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOE</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>.734</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. SEA = self-emotions appraisal; SEA= others-emotions appraisal; OEA = use of emotion; UOE = regulation of emotion.

To examine the difference in relationships between the groups, the Fisher R to Z transformation statistic was used to determine significance between their correlation coefficients. Statistical differences were found in the correlation coefficients with relationships between self-efficacy and EI-SEA being the greatest (see Table 8).

Table 8

Fisher Transformations Comparing the Correlation Coefficients for Officers and NCOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EI</th>
<th>EI-SEA</th>
<th>EI-OEA</th>
<th>EI-UOE</th>
<th>EI-ROE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.37**</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>1.82*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>-1.88*</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>-.57</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.33</td>
<td>-2.12*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; EI – emotional intelligence; SEA = self-emotions appraisal; SEA= others-emotions appraisal; OEA = use of emotion; UOE = regulation of emotion.

Table 9 is the ANOVA comparing the four ranking groups against each other. There are no statistical differences between the groups. This comparison did not address a research question; it was done to challenge the researcher’s assumptions about junior vs. senior levels of both groups.
Table 9

Comparing Self-Efficacy and Emotional Intelligence by Pay Grade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>E5-E6 (n=16)</th>
<th>E7-E9 (n=32)</th>
<th>O1-O3 (n=14)</th>
<th>O4+ (n=19)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>35.78</td>
<td>36.21</td>
<td>35.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>5.765</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>5.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>6.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOE</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>5.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. SEA = self-emotions appraisal; OEA = others-emotions appraisal; UOE = use of emotion; ROE = regulation of emotion.

Summary

RQ 1 attempted to identify if a relationship exists between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force non-commissioned officers. Analysis of the data collected from the sample showed a strong relationship between the self-efficacy of NCOs and subcategories of EI. Specifically, data showed that the higher their appraisal of OEA and their UOE the higher the self-efficacy of the NCOs.

RQ 2 attempted to identify if a relationship exists between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force commissioned officers. Analysis of the data collected from the sample showed a significant relationship between the self-efficacy of officers and subcategories of EI. Specifically, data showed that SEA, their UOE, and their ROE have a significant impact on the self-efficacy of officers.

RQ 3 attempted to identify differences between the relationship of emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in NCOs and officers. Data showed that both groups had high means in both EI and self-efficacy, with little difference in the overall scores for both groups. Closer examination of the subcategories of EI, however, revealed that
statistical differences were found in the correlation coefficients, with relationships between self-efficacy and SEA being the greatest and ROE being the next greatest.

As a matter of interest, survey results were also compared by ranks. There was no significance between low/high NCOs and low/high officers.
CHAPTER V: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of the Study

Purpose Statement and Research Questions

The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to identify the relationship between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force NCO and commissioned officers. This study also explored if a statistically significant difference exists between the correlation coefficients for non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.

The research questions this study sought to answer were:

1. What is the relationship between emotional intelligence, as measured by the Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS) (Wong & Law, 2002) and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) General Self-Efficacy (GSE) in non-commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force?

2. What is the relationship between emotional intelligence, as measured by the WLEIS (Wong & Law, 2002) and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) GSE in commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force?

3. What statistical difference exists between the correlation coefficients of emotional intelligence, as measured by the WLEIS (Wong & Law, 2002) and self-efficacy, as measured by the Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) GSE for commissioned and non-commissioned U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force officers?
Population and Sample

The population for the study were non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. The sample consisted of non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the U.S. Army and U.S Air Force who were stationed on Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Tacoma, Washington.

Methodology

The method of collecting data consisted of emailing a link to an anonymous survey via an intermediary, as well as advertising the survey link and asking for participation in the base newspaper.

Major Findings

RQ 1 explored if a relationship exists between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in non-commissioned officers. The data showed that the higher the NCOs’ ability to recognize the emotions of others, and the higher their ability to use emotions, the higher their self-efficacy.

RQ 2 explored if a relationship exists between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in commissioned officers. The data showed that the higher the officers’ ability to recognize their own emotions, the higher their ability to use emotions, and the higher their ability to regulate emotions, the higher their self-efficacy.

RQ 3 compared the responses of the NCOs and commissioned officers to see if a significant difference existed in their emotional intelligence and self-efficacy results. A comparison of the correlation coefficients showed significant differences with the differences between self-efficacy and SEA being the greatest and self-efficacy and ROE being the next greatest.
Findings Related to the Literature

A review of the literature on emotional intelligence and self-efficacy revealed that both are crucial to leadership. Research has proven that emotional intelligence is a necessary quality in a leader’s effectiveness in motivating others, and that leaders must have good awareness of their own emotions and those of others (Wong & Law, 2002; Miller, 2014). Research has also proven that if a person’s self-efficacy is high, that person will be more likely to succeed in their tasks (Meadows, 2015).

A review of the literature on military leadership showed a gap in the writings; emotional intelligence and self-efficacy were terms not found in any of the past or current writings. When attributes related to emotional intelligence or self-efficacy were described in the military writings as desirable in leaders, there were no follow-on instructions for the leaders in how to build these traits. This seemed problematic, because military leaders are required to motivate their subordinates and lead them to mission accomplishment.

This study endeavored to discover if a relationship exists between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy in military leaders. The data collected in the study showed that a relationship does exist, but in differing strengths in non-commissioned and commissioned officers.

In NCOs, a moderately strong correlation was found between their OEA and their self-efficacy. These findings are in line with the literature, which shows that an understanding of the emotions of others is a necessary part of leadership, and that the higher a leaders’ emotional intelligence, the higher the leader’s self-efficacy (Goleman et al., 1996-2013). Also, a moderately strong correlation was found between their UOE and...
their self-efficacy. Use of emotion is a little more ambiguous than understanding the emotions of others. Looking at the survey questions for UOE, it can be seen that UOE focuses on a leader’s goal-setting and achievement, competence, self-motivation, and self-encouragement, all traits of self-efficacy (Tracy, 2012). It follows, therefore, that there would be a strong correlation between UOE and self-efficacy. A weak correlation was found between a NCO’s SEA and their self-efficacy. This would imply that they do not recognize the importance of self-awareness of their emotions. This is unfortunate, because leaders must have good awareness and regulation of their own emotions as well as those of others (Wong & Law, 2002, p. 245)

In commissioned officers, there was a strong correlation between their SEA, ROE, UOE, and their self-efficacy. Again, these findings are supported by the current literature on emotional intelligence and self-efficacy. Awareness of one’s own emotions and the ability to regulate those emotions is important in good leaders (Wong & Law, 2002; Miller, 2014). Just as with NCOs, UOE is critical to the self-efficacy of commissioned officers (Tracy, 2012). A weak correlation was found in the results of commissioned officers’ OEA. This is understandable considering their training and responsibilities, but it does show an area that needs to be developed in commissioned officers.

Unwanted Findings

Because the training and duties of non-commissioned and commissioned officers differ so greatly, it was expected that the two groups would have greatly different scores in emotional intelligence and self-efficacy. Surprisingly, their overall scores in both categories were similar, with both groups having fairly high means. It was only on close
inspection of the emotional intelligence subcategories that the differences showed themselves.

NCOs scored high in the subcategories of emotional intelligence, yet some of their highest emotional intelligence scores had weak correlations with self-efficacy. For instance, their overall SEA was .59, but the correlation with self-efficacy was -.07. This could mean that NCOs do not see awareness of their own emotions as important to their effectiveness. ROE was also a moderately weak correlation with self-efficacy for NCOs. Again, it is possible that they do not see the importance of self-management to the mission.

The results for commissioned officers was almost opposite those of NCOs when the subcategories of emotional intelligence were analyzed. Unlike the NCOs, the commissioned officers showed a strong correlations between their SEA, ROE, and self-efficacy, and a weak correlation between their OEA and self-efficacy.

Also, because of the difference in practical experience as well as differences in responsibility, it was expected that the junior/lower levels of both non-commissioned and commissioned officers would have lower scores than the senior/higher levels. This was not the case. The mean levels of emotional intelligence and self-efficacy were relatively high for both groups, with no differences shown in the breakdown of ranks.

**Conclusions**

This study showed that non-commissioned officers have relatively high emotional intelligence and self-efficacy scores, but that their self-efficacy does not necessarily depend upon their emotional intelligence. There was a moderately strong correlation between their OEA, their UOE, and their self-efficacy. Based on these data, one would
conclude that NCOs value their ability to understand their subordinates’ emotions, as well as their own ability to use their emotions in the accomplishment of the mission, but they do not seem to value introspection or others’ approval when it comes to their self-efficacy.

Considering the role of NCOs as the backbone of the military, the “fathers” of the unit, and the required interpersonal interaction they have with individual service members in their units, the importance of OEA and UOE to their self-efficacy makes sense, although the correlation is only moderately strong. This focus on others, rather than self, showed up in the low correlation scores of the NCOs’ SEA and ROE. From these findings, it would be concluded that NCOs value emotions in terms of taking care of and motivating others, rather than on introspection and management of their emotions. NCOs train the soldiers and lead the charges in battle, just as SFC Lomell did on D day, which leaves little time for self-reflection or being concerned with how others see them.

Commissioned officers’ results were quite different from those of NCOs. In three of the subcategories of emotional intelligence there was a moderately strong correlation with self-efficacy. Their self-emotions appraisal, regulation of emotion, and use of emotion all showed a significant correlation with their self-efficacy. Their others emotions appraisal was a very weak correlation with self-efficacy. It could be concluded that OEA is less important to the self-efficacy of commissioned officers because they seldom interact with individual service members. The responsibilities of commissioned officers are to the unit as a whole, to the mission, and to their superiors. Just as Captain Dawson had to tell his men, “You’ve got to stand it…” as he sent them back up the hill to die, commissioned officers are not trained to focus on the emotions of their subordinates.
Writings on military leadership over the years have admonished commissioned officers to know and monitor themselves and build their leadership qualities. This has forced them to focus inward.

Based upon these overall findings, the research conducted suggests that both Commissioned Officers and NCO’s have a focus on mission overall but a different focus on the personnel involved. This means that decision making regarding mission and personnel may be influenced by those perspectives. It is also concluded that a more common understanding and approach for both commissioned and NCOs would reduce variables in decision making related to personnel.

**Implications for Action**

The findings in the data did not uncover any weaknesses on the part of NCOs or commissioned officers. Rather, data showed relatively high scores in emotional intelligence and self-efficacy.

The scrutinizing of emotional intelligence subcategories showed some possible areas for improvement, however. The correlation between emotional intelligence and self-efficacy were not incredibly strong in all of the EI subcategories, but they were significant.

**EI and SE Training**

The researcher recommends that military leaders’ training include both training and assessment in emotional intelligence and self-efficacy. Emotional intelligence enhances good decision making and self-efficacy provides the confidence to carry out decisions.
The military would benefit by training their NCOs and commissioned officers on emotional intelligence, to build leaders with a more complete understanding of their own emotional intelligence as well as the emotional intelligence of others. In order to facilitate the training and retention of the concepts, a common language related to emotional intelligence and its subcategories would be helpful. The pattern from the findings is that the NCOs are focusing more on others’ emotions, while the commissioned officers are focusing more on their own. This is not wrong; they are doing what their training and responsibilities dictate. If their perspectives can be more balanced by an increased level of understanding of all subcategories of emotional intelligence for themselves and for others, they will be that much stronger as leaders. This understanding would result in a stronger ability to lead themselves and others. Higher emotional intelligence scores could result in higher self-efficacy in both groups of leaders.

Bradberry and Greaves outline strategies for building emotional intelligence in their book (2009) *Emotional Intelligence 2.0*. These strategies are numerous and address all aspects of emotional intelligence.

Some of the strategies the military would be wise to incorporate into their training for NCOs in order to develop their SEA are:

Self-Awareness Strategies:

- Quit treating your emotions as good or bad: Suspending judgment of emotions allows them to run their course and vanish.
- Observe the ripple effect of your emotions: Your emotions affect everyone around you.
• Lean into your discomfort: Rather than avoiding a feeling, the goal should be to move toward the emotion, into it, and eventually through it.

• Feel your emotions physically: The body and mind are tightly connected; physical responses can help one understand one’s emotions.

• Know who and what pushes your emotions: Knowing your triggers can help you manage them.

• Watch yourself like a hawk: Develop an objective view of your emotions as you are experiencing them.

Some of the strategies the military would be wise to incorporate into their training for commissioned officers in order to develop their OEA are:

Social Awareness Strategies:

• Watch body language: Eye contact, facial expressions, and posture will give clues to a person’s emotions.

• Go on a 15 minute tour: Similar to “management by walking around” the mission of this tour is to walk around observing the emotions in and mood of the workplace.

• Practice the art of listening: Set aside distractions and fully observe and listen to the person communicating in order to sense emotions as well as hear the message.

• Test for accuracy: When in doubt, just ask. Ask if what you’re observing in people or the situation is actually what is occurring.

*Emotional Intelligence 2.0* lists additional strategies, and more can also be found on the Talent Smart website. These are helpful resources for building a training plan.
Career Long EI and SE Assessment

Emotional intelligence and self-efficacy can both be affected by a person’s circumstances. Military officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, encounter drastically changing circumstances throughout their careers. Many of those circumstances, by the nature of military activity, can be very stressful or traumatic. It is recommended that annual emotional intelligence and self-efficacy assessment be a part of the career portfolio for both commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Tracking baseline data regarding emotional intelligence and self-efficacy to review the data for major changes would be another tool for the military to keep its leaders on a stable platform for both emotional intelligence and self-efficacy throughout their careers. It could also serve as another means of determining the effect of stress and trauma on military leaders if administered following a traumatic event. It has been proven that Post-Traumatic Stress can impair one’s ability to manage emotions, specifically emotions related to stressful situations. Research has shown that the part of the brain responsible for the “fight or flight” reaction to stress (the amygdala) is kept in check by another portion of the brain (the ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Post-Traumatic Stress impairs the ventromedial prefrontal cortex’s ability to inhibit the amygdala to keep the stress response in check (Sherin et al., 2011). Emotional intelligence assessments and training conducted on an ongoing basis may assist military leaders who are experiencing Post-Traumatic Stress.
Recommendations for Further Research

Further research needs to be done across the U.S. Armed Forces as a whole. Studying one or two branches cannot provide answers for each of the separate branches, and their unique missions may result in different conclusions.

Findings from one military base can be generalized, but a larger sample conducted across an entire service will increase the generalizability. Research conducted on a scale that large would require coordination at the highest levels of the Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, and Department of the Navy. This would require early, formal requests through the highest channels for each service, as well as endorsements from the chain of command for each service.

Because of the cybersecurity risk posed by surveys from sources outside of the military, such as SurveyMonkey, an alternate method of presenting the survey to service members would be needed. Valid, reliable instruments such as the GSE and WLEIS are best, but can be delivered through a survey developed by approved military cybersecurity professionals.

If more demographic information can be collected in the survey process, it may yield further valuable data. A commissioned officer, for example, may have been enlisted before becoming an officer. This could change the results for emotional intelligence and self-efficacy for that officer, and skew the overall officer ratings. For that same reason, Warrant Officers’ data may change the overall officer results. Confidentiality is crucial to protect the service members, but perhaps with assurances from their chain of command, service members will be willing in future studies to share a bit more valuable detail about their career paths.
Each branch of military service also has different fields within it, such as Medical, Intelligence, and Special Operations. The norms and duties within each field can differ greatly. It would be valuable to research the fields separately to determine if differences exist between them. If significant differences are found, training for each field can be tailored to their needs.

**Concluding Remarks and Reflections**

Data collection for this study was more problematic than the researcher expected. Today’s military is under a constant threat from cyber-attacks and scammers. Because of this, surveys taken on military computers can create a security risk. Also because of this, the military community is understandably suspicious of contact from unknown sources via email. The initial attempt by the researcher to distribute the survey was met with great resistance and garnered too small of a response to be of assistance. This led to creative attempts to reach the military community without impacting their cyber security. On reflection, future research permission should be sought months, or even years, in advance directly from the higher levels of each military branch. Perhaps if a high-level member of each service branch were to introduce and endorse the research, this would help smooth the way for the study.

Every researcher has personal assumptions and biases. This researcher was no different. I started in the military as an enlisted person, and my leadership training was received both on-the-job in “acting” positions, and at the Non-Commissioned Officers’ Academy in Fort Shafter, HI. After I switched services and worked my way up to become a commissioned officer, I was surprised at the lack of leadership training for me and my fellow officers. This led to my assumption that the emotional intelligence levels
of commissioned officers would be lower than that of NCOs. I was wrong. The data did not support my assumption; I was surprised but happy to learn that the emotional intelligence and self-efficacy levels of both groups of leaders were equally high.

The military is a fascinating community, and there are any number of studies that could be done to find ways to help them accomplish their mission and to bring them home from hostile environments safely. The challenge is to find non-intrusive, non-threatening ways to conduct the research as well as helpful, cost-effective means to help them implement the findings.
REFERENCES


## APPENDIX A

### Literature Matrix

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APPENDIX B

The WLEIS Survey

There are a total of 16 items and four factors in the WLEIS scale. The questions in the scale are:

**Emotional intelligence items:**

**Self-emotion appraisal (SEA)**

1. I have a good sense of why I have certain feelings most of the time.
2. I have a good understanding of my own emotions.
3. I really understand what I feel.
4. I always know whether or not I am happy.

**Others’ emotions appraisal (OEA)**

5. I always know my friends’ emotions from their behavior.
6. I am a good observer of others’ emotions.
7. I am sensitive to the feelings and emotions of others.
8. I have a good understanding of the emotions of people around me.

**Use of emotion (UOE)**

9. I always set goals for myself and then try my best to achieve them.
10. I always tell myself I am a competent person.
11. I am a self-motivated person.
12. I would always encourage myself to try my best.

**Regulation of emotion (ROE)**

13. I am able to control my temper and handle difficulties rationally.
14. I am quite capable of controlling my own emotions.
15. I can always calm down quickly when I am very angry.

16. I have good control of my own emotions.

The WLEIS uses a 7-point Likert scale for the answers with values of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
APPENDIX C

The GSE Survey

The GSE, a 10 item psychometric scale, will be used to measure self-efficacy. The tool is designed to assess an individual’s optimistic belief in his or her own ability to cope with daily work stressors, and to measure the person’s ability to deal with obstacles or setbacks (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995).

The English version of the questions in the GSE scale are:

1. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want.
3. It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
5. Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations.
6. I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
7. I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities.
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.
9. If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
10. I can usually handle whatever comes my way.

The response options are: 1 = Not at all true; 2 = Hardly true; 3 = Moderately true; 4 = Exactly true.
# APPENDIX D

## Brandman IRB Approval

<table>
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<th>BRANDBMAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD</th>
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**Date**: 02/24/2010

**Name of Investigator/Researcher**: Kelly A. Hudson

**Faculty or Student ID Number**: 800422045

**Title of Research Project**: Emotional Intelligence and Self-Efficacy in U.S. Military Leaders

**Project Type**: ✔ New  ❋ Continuation  ❋ Resubmission

**Category that applies to your research**:

- ✔ Doctoral Dissertation EdD
- ❋ DNP Clinical Project
- ❋ Masters' Thesis
- ❋ Course Project
- ❋ Faculty Professional/Academic Research
- ❋ Other:  

**Funded**: ✔ No  ❋ Yes  

(Funding Agency, Type of Funding, Grant Number)

**Project Duration (cannot exceed 1 year)**: Two months

**Principal Investigator's Address**: 8036 29th Way SE, Olympia, WA 98513

**Email Address**: kahudson@bradman.edu  

**Telephone Number**: 960-780-5431

**Faculty Advisor/Sponsor/Chair Name**: Dr. Phil Pendley

**Email Address**: Pendley@brandman.edu  

**Telephone Number**: 951-712-2085

**Category of Review**: ✔ Expedited Review  ❋ Standard Review

Brandman University IRB Rev, 11.14.14  

Adopted  

November 2014
I have completed the NIH Certification and included a copy with this proposal

NIH Certificate currently on file in the office of the IRB Chair or Department Office

Kelly A. Hudson
Signature of Principal Investigator: ____________________________ Date: 02/22/16

Dr. Phil Pendley
Signature of Faculty Advisor/ Sponsor/Dissertation Chair: ____________________________ Date: 02/24/16
BRANDMAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
IRB APPLICATION ACTION – APPROVAL

COMPLETED BY BUIRB

IRB ACTION/APPROVAL

Name of Investigator/Researcher: Kelly A. Hudson

☑ Approved as submitted.

☐ Returned without review. Insufficient detail to adequately assess risks, protections and benefits.

☐ Approved/Certified as Exempt form IRB Review.

☐ Approved, contingent on minor revisions (see attached)

☐ Requires significant modifications of the protocol before approval. Research must resubmit with modifications (see attached)

☐ Researcher must contact IRB member and discuss revisions to research proposal and protocol.

Level of Risk: ☐ No Risk    ☑ Minimal Risk    ☐ More than Minimal Risk

IRB Comments:


IRB Reviewer: Dr. David Long

Telephone: --------------------------------- Email: dlong@brandman.edu

BUIRB Chair: Dr. Douglas DeVore

Date: 3/3/16

REVISED IRB Application

☐ Approved  ☐ Returned

Name: 

Telephone: Email: Date:

BUIRB Chair: 

APPENDIX E

Brandman IRB Approval-Modification

BRANDMAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
Request for Modification of Approved Project

Investigators must submit the Request for Modification for when any document or procedure within the IRB approved protocol is revised. There is only one exception to this rule, specifically where the change is necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. In such cases, the investigator must submit a report to IRB explaining the protocol deviation. Amendments involving minor changes that pose no more than minimal risk to subjects will be reviewed on an expedited basis. Changes may not be implemented until final written IRB approval is received.

INSTRUCTIONS: The entire form must be completed. Submit this application with the following:

- If the consent has been modified, submit a copy of the modified form with the changes marked, plus an unmarked copy
- A copy of the modified research protocol
- A summary of protocol modifications

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PROJECT TITLE

Emotional Intelligence and Self-Efficacy in Military Leaders

1. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ORIGINAL PROTOCOL: (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Data collection for dissertation to be conducted via link to anonymous survey emailed through an intermediary.
2. DESCRIBE THE MODIFICATION(S) REQUESTED. INCLUDE REASONS FOR THE CHANGE(S).

Request permission to post link in base newspaper asking for responses from E-5s and above.

3. WILL THE MODIFICATION(S), IN YOUR OPINION, INCREASE OR DECREASE THE RISK OF HARM TO THE SUBJECTS? □ Increase □ Decrease □ No change

Explain (attach sheets as necessary):

4. WILL THE MODIFICATION(S) ALTER THE APPROVED CONSENT FORM? □ Yes □ No

If yes, attach original and one copy of a revised consent form, with additions and deletions clearly marked, to this form for review and approval.

5. DID ANY UNANTICIPATED PROTOCOL DEVIATIONS (INCLUDING ERRORS AND ACCIDENTS) OCCUR SINCE THE LAST REVIEW? □ Yes □ No

If yes, summarize all protocol deviations (attach sheets as necessary):

6. HAVE UNANTICIPATED RISKS OR SIGNIFICANT NEW FINDINGS BEEN DISCOVERED SINCE THE PREVIOUS IRB REVIEW THAT MIGHT AFFECT THE SUBJECTS’ WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE PARTICIPATION? □ Yes □ No

If yes, complete the following:
   a) Explain the risks or findings in detail (Attached sheets as necessary):
   b) Do these risks or finding require modification of the informed consent form?
      □ Yes □ No
   c) Were subjects notified of these risks or findings? □ Yes □ No
   d) Were subjects reconsented? □ Yes □ No

I certify that none of these changes have been made and that no changes will be implemented prior to IRB review and approval.

Principal Investigator: ___________________________ Digitally signed by Kelly A. Hudson Date: 2018.03.11 15:21:13 -0800

Brandman University IRB Adopted November 2013
The modification/amendment described on page 1 qualifies for and has been approved by expedited review.

The modification/amendment described on page 1 has been reviewed and approved by the Brandman University Institutional Review Board.

The modification/amendment described on page requires additional changes to secure approval.

COMMENTS:

Researcher encountered unanticipated problems with sending the anonymous survey link to military service members due to their heightened security protocols. Placing an advertisement in the base newspaper will allow service members to find out about the study and have access to the link without the use of email. The base newspaper will become the intermediary by which the link is distributed, rather than a person sending an email on the researcher's behalf. The advertisement will ask the service members to respond to the survey via their personal, not military, computers, thus alleviating security concerns of the military.

Digitally signed by Doug DeVore
DN: cn=Doug DeVore, or=Brandman University, ou=EDU, email=devore@brandman.edu,
Date: 2014.03.11 10:54:29 -07'00"

03-11-16

Chair, Brandman University Institutional Review Board

Brandman University IRB

Adopted

November 2013